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ABSTRACT: There are emotively powerful words that can modify our judgment, arouse our emotions 
and influence our decisions. This paper shows how the use of emotive meaning in argumentation can 
be explained by showing how their logical dimension, which can be analysed using argumentation 
schemes, combines with heuristic processes triggered by emotions.  Arguing with emotive words is 
shown to use value-based practical reasoning grounded on hierarchies of values and maxims of 
experience for evaluative classification.     
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The 2013 Italian presidential election can be considered as a rhetorical battlefield. 
The different parties (especially the right- and left-wing coalitions) focused more on 
attacking the alternatives than promoting constructive programs. In this context, a 
crucial role was played by rhetoric and in particular by emotive words. The voters 
were not provided with slogans describing long-term plans, but mainly with terms 
crystallizing negative properties of the competing parties. Instead of reporting and 
describing complex reasoning or lengthy discourses, the newspapers quoted such 
emotive characterizations and contributed to creating a war of epithets. This 
political example highlights a fundamental argumentative strategy, the use of 
emotive or ethical terms. If we leave for a moment the political and statistical 
considerations and analyze this tactic from a philosophical, argumentative and 
linguistic perspective, we are left with unanswered questions. The first one can be 
formulated as follows: What makes a word emotive?  
There are words – or rather concepts – that do not simply describe a 
fragment of possible reality. “Terrorist” is not simply used to refer to a person who 
commits specific actions with a specific intent. Words such as “torture” or 
“massacre”, “freedom” or “peace” carry with them something more than a simple 
description of a state of affairs, a mere conceptual content (Stevenson, 1944, p. 210). 
These words are “ethical”: they have a “magnetic” effect (Stevenson, 1937, p. 16), an 
FABRIZIO MACAGNO 
2 
imperative force, a tendency to influence the interlocutor’s decisions (Stevenson, 
1937, pp. 18-19). In the modern psychological terminology, we can say that there 
terms carry “emotional valence” (Frijda & Mesquita, 2000, p. 49): at the same time, 
they presuppose and trigger a value judgment that can lead to an emotion.  
 In politics and other domains of human communication, these terms play a 
crucial role (Schiappa, 2003; Zarefsky, 2004). They change the evaluation of a state 
of affairs, and modify the interlocutor’s attitudes and choices concerning it. They 
hide the complexity of a judgment on a complex entity or event, providing the 
hearer with a pre-packaged suggested evaluation, an allegedly objective 
representation pointing out only specific ethical (or rather evaluative) dimensions. 
These powerful instruments of persuasion raise problems that exceed the domain of 
rhetoric and argumentation, but that are crucial for understanding the mechanism 
of the rhetorical effect that they trigger. How can a word be emotive? How can value 
judgments be related to emotions? Why are emotions used to affect decisions?  
The answers to these questions need to be searched for in the analysis of the 
complex structure of emotions and the reasoning mechanisms that have been 
investigated under the label of “heuristics” or “peripheral processes” (Petty et al., 
2004; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
 
2. THE POWER AND THE USES OF EMOTIVE WORDS 
 
Attacking the competing parties and politicians is a strategy that is frequently used 
during the elections in many countries. However, in the 2013 Italian presidential 
elections the number and the originality of the attacks were unusual. As a matter of 
fact, three individuals dominated the scene, showing an incredible creativity in 
forging new epithets for depicting their (possible) rivals in a negative manner: 
Beppe Grillo, leader of the Movimento 5 Stelle, Silvio Berlusconi, the politician who 
ruled the country for the last 18 years, and Mario Monti, the outgoing prime 
minister. While the political campaign of Grillo was centered on public speeches, 
organized as polemic and comic shows, Berlusconi heavily relied on advertisements 
and programs on the several mass media of his property (TV channels, newspapers, 
magazines…) and ads sent by ordinary mail. Finally, Monti did not organize a 
massive political campaign, but rather released interviews in which he explained his 
program.  
The communication tactics of the three parties mirror the type of strategy 
adopted, and the type of ethos, or rather communicative character, of the person 
representing them. Grillo acted as a comic actor and polemical public speaker, 
defending his positions by pointing out the critical issues of the political and 
economic behavior in Italy in a funny and entertaining fashion. Monti, as a famous 
professor and economist, underscored the economic problems of the country, 
proposing a program to face them. Berlusconi acted as the victim of a conspiracy 
aimed at discrediting him and, at the same time, he also embodied the prototypical 
ideals of the stereotypical Italian male.  
The attack strategies grounded on emotive words varied noticeably 
depending on the politician. Grillo used the strategy of amplification (Quintiliani 
Institutio Oratoria, VI, 2, 23-30; Calboli Montefusco, 2004), namely the classification 
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of an entity or an event using indignant language (Aristotle, Rhetoric II, 24, 3), based 
on a slight manipulation of circumstances or facts that are or can be commonly 
accepted. Quintilian illustrated this tactic with the example of a dishonest man 
turned into a “robber”, or the wounds of another transformed into a simple injury 
(Institutio Oratoria, VIII, 4, 1). The strategy of distorting reality is based on the 
similarity between the altered image of reality and what is commonly regarded as 
real. The effectiveness of this dialogical move can be enhanced by combining the 
distortion with other communicative tactics. Grillo exploits in particular one of 
them, the use of the comic role. His characterization of the opponents are funny, 
exaggerated, and at the same time they place the interlocutor in a scenario in which 
the boundary between reality and fiction is blurred (Meyer, 2000; Smith & Voth, 
2002), and lead the interlocutor to a negative judgment based on a limited 
dimension of the issue. For instance we can consider his description of the left-wing 
opponent, Pier Luigi Bersani1:  
 
Case 1 
Bersani “is not a fascist. He is only a loser. But I accuse him of having made 
arrangements with former fascists and masons for twenty years, sharing among 
them also the bones of this Country”.  
 
In this case, his attack is highly emotional and based on heavy exaggerations. He 
uses words such as “fascist” and “mason”2, he describes him as a “loser” and depicts 
his actions as “sharing the bones of a country”. However, the grounds of his attack 
are or can be shared by the audience, as Bersani directly or indirectly supported 
members of the Parliament having strong right-wing positions or connections with 
masonic organizations (illegal in Italy). A similarly charged description is provided 
on the right-wing (Lega Nord) politician, Roberto Maroni:  
 
Case 2 
He is a dreaming barbarian. He always dreams of fooling us. 
 
In this case, Grillo amplifies the poorly refined manners of the politician and its 
party in general, adding a comment on his real intentions. The strategy of reducing a 
person to few adjectives the negative traits allows the audience to draw an easy 
value judgment on him, grounded on likely facts that can be also unknown to 
someone in the public. For instance, he describes the Fiat CEO, Sergio Marchionne (a 
figure extremely relevant for the Italian economy and employment, often involved 
in political discussions) taking for granted the fact that he has his residence in 
Switzerland. In this fashion, Grillo depicts him as a foreigner plunderer:  
 
Case 3 
A Swiss citizen who wears a cashmere jersey and pursues the policy of 
disintegrating the Italian industry.  
                                                        
1 http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/interni/ebetino-fallito-salma-tutto-grillo-insulto-insulto-
834396.html (Retrieved on 4 March 2012).  
2 Masonry is illegal in Italy, and frequently related with high-level criminal organizations.  
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These descriptions are extreme and funny. They provide a clear clue for an easy 
value judgment, based on the emphasis on few negative traits (other of his 
descriptions involve calling Berlusconi “the bouncing dwarf” and Monti “father 
Merrin”, the priest in the Exorcist) and the omission of other positive achievements 
or qualities. However, the audience expects the use of such extravagant epithets 
from a showman known for his comic-political shows. The force and grounds of the 
attack are considered in a type of dialogue different from the real one, marked by 
jokes and exaggerations aimed at entertaining.  
 A completely different approach can be found in Monti’s statements. He is 
not joking at all; on the contrary, he acts pursuant to his character and his role of 
economist, statesman and intellectual. He grounds his attacks, mostly directed 
against Berlusconi, on emotional and sour descriptions. For instance we can 
consider the following statement3: 
  
Case 4 
“Berlusconi continues making promises, trying to buy the votes of the Italian people 
with the money of the Italian people.” […] According to Monti, “this can lead to 
popularity, but this would be a challenge for a Country that is basically without 
memory. I do not want to believe that the Italians do not remember their past”.  
 
Here, Monti accuses Berlusconi of buying the votes of the Italians, and at the same 
time poisons the well of his possible supporters, classifying them as “people without 
memory” (referring to the disastrous conditions of Italian economy left by 
Berlusconi’s government). In another interview he explicitly pointed out the 
mismanagement of his predecessor, claiming to be distressed when “some jackasses 
say that they have left Italy in good conditions in 2011.” 4 This attack is aimed at 
arousing both anger against his opponent (Berlusconi is deceiving and stealing for 
his own interest) and contempt towards the supporters thereof (people without 
memory are like puppets). The emotion of anger is combined with fear in the 
following similitude drawn between Berlusconi and the Pied Piper5:  
 
Case 5 
According to the outgoing prime minister, the promises made by Silvio Berlusconi 
“are similar to the Pied Piper of Hamelin who lures away the mice. The fact that the 
Italians can believe to some words stated by that mouth reminds me of the Pied 
Piper, who takes the mice to drown”, said the professor. He admits: Berlusconi “has 
already deceived the Italian people three times. The first time I was also deceived.”  
  
 Here, Monti underscores the deceitful and treacherous character of Berlusconi by 
                                                        
3 http://www.unita.it/italia/monti-nega-nessuna-spaccatura-su-voto-disgiunto-1.482792 (Retrieved 
on 3 March 2012).  
4 http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2013-02-15/monti-interviene-inchieste-questi-
082340.shtml?uuid=AbN2sdUH (Retrieved on 3 March 2012). 
5 http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2013/01/14/news/monti_situazione_grave_colpa_di_chi_ha_ 
governato_prima-50540745/ (Retrieved on 3 March 2012).  
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describing his promises as aimed at “luring” the Italians to disaster and “deceiving” 
them. He points out his unjust and detrimental actions against the people to trigger 
anger, while the story of the Pied Piper is intended to underline the danger through 
the fear for the possible consequences.  
 The reaction of Berlusconi to this attack follows the character that he plays, 
characterized by victimization (he is the victim of an injustice and a conspiracy) and 
closeness to his idea of the stereotypical Italian man (aggressive, womanizer, vulgar 
and soccer fan) (emphasis added)6:  
 
Case 6 
“Who claims this is a scumbag; this is an action of a scumbag, as the spread is 
something that is independent from everything. These are the claims of the left 
wing; these are lies, it is not the truth”. Berlusconi raises his voice and states again 
that “this this part of the conspiracy, as they wanted to clear a government away in 
order to pursue the interest of the other European countries.” And then concerning 
the “pied piper”: “I, a pied piper? He also deceived us, and this is a real hoax and we 
have been all deceived. We hoped that this man were what he appeared to be. 
Probably he also wants to tax my “pipe”…”  
 
The vulgar and ungrounded epithets (in another interview he called Monti a 
“madman”7) and the off-color joke are aimed at showing a resemblance between the 
billionaire and the ordinary man (or at least the prototype depicted by him). The 
indignant language, taking for granted the falsity of the claims of a famous 
economist (“these are lies”) and a secret plan of the other European countries 
(“conspiracy”), is intended to convey the simple picture of a victim, to be 
sympathized with. He then replies to Monti’s attack (which was actually grounded 
on economic figures) by accusing him of deceiving the people. However, different 
from Monti’s remarks, Berlusconi’s counterattack is not grounded on any reason, 
except for the popular dissatisfaction with the austerity measures.  
 In this political debate also Berlusconi’s criminal charges (and convictions) 
could have played an important role, but the leader of the right-wing coalition 
managed to present them as part of the conspiracy against him (emphasis added)8:  
 
Case 7 
“The judges of the court of Milan should be tried, as they are horrible defamation 
machines. It is a true scandal”. Then Berlusconi added that Ms. Bocassini <the public 
Prosecutor> “should be tried for her use of the resources of the state to set up an 
inexistent accusation.” “It is a barbarous country, in which one is accused of indirect 
support to the Mafia only because one goes to a dinner. We have reached a level of 
sickness that we need to defeat now”.  
  
                                                        
6 http://www.ilmessaggero.it/primopiano/politica/berlusconi_monti_sotto_choc/notizie/244357. 
shtml (Retrieved on 3 March 2012).  
7 http://www.unita.it/italia/berlusconi-l-anm-insorge-nessuna-barbarie-1.459541 (Retrieved on 3 
March 2012). 
8 http://www.ilmessaggero.it/primopiano/politica/berlusconi_monti_sotto_choc/notizie/244357. 
shtml (Retrieved on 3 March 2012). 
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With his emotive epithets, Berlusconi takes for granted ungrounded facts (the 
judges aim at discrediting honest citizens; the charges against him are false) and 
arouses anger against what he calls the “dictatorship of the public prosecutors.” His 
blatant denial of proved facts and previous judgments cannot be based on reasons. 
For this reason, he simply amplifies the alleged injustice of the Italian legal system 
and minimizes the charges pressed against him and his collaborators (the 
connections with Mafia become “dinners”).  
 These examples show how emotive words can be used as instrument for 
providing the interlocutor with an emotional description, namely a representation 
aimed at arousing an emotive reaction. This reaction is interconnected with a value 
judgment, in the sense that at the same it presupposes such an evaluation and leads 
the interlocutor to draw it through the emotion. However, this tactic is not as simple 
as it appears to be. The three political characters use the same instrument of 
persuasion within different more complex strategies. The emotional epithets were 
accepted within Grillo’s comic role as part of hilarious caricatures. Monti’s sour 
remarks are grounded on his presupposed and commonly shared authority and 
superior knowledge. Berlusconi uses emotive words to turn the political 
confrontation into a street fight, where the criticisms against his political figure 
become attacks against himself as an ordinary man9. His acting mirrors the 
impulsive and indignant reaction of an unjustly offended person.  
 Emotive words can have a noticeable impact on the audience’s judgments 
and decisions. In order to analyze their effectiveness, it is necessary to take into 
consideration two distinct and connected dimensions of this instrument: their 
logical function as implicit and condensed arguments, and their rhetorical effect 
consisting in arousing emotions.  
 
3. THE ARGUMENTATIVE STRUCTURE OF EMOTIVE WORDS 
 
Stevenson defined emotive words as words “that involve a wedding of descriptive 
and emotive meaning “, and have the power of directing attitudes (Stevenson, 1944, 
p. 210). These words are used to refer to a fragment of reality, but at the same time 
they have the tendency to encourage future actions (Stevenson, 1938, p. 49-50) and 
lead the hearer towards a change by affecting his system of interests (Stevenson, 
1944, p. 210). This tendency amounts to a disposition of such terms to be used to 
achieve a specific effect, to move the hearer and change his attitude towards action. 
Stevenson’s account can be analyzed from two distinct perspectives. On the one 
hand, it is possible to investigate the structure of the reasoning leading from the 
predication of a word to a reason to act. On the other hand, it is necessary to analyze 
what makes a word “magnetic” (as Stevenson describes the emotive meaning), 
namely strongly encouraging a course of action.  
The first step consists in inquiring into what links a word to a possible choice, 
and for this reason we need to build on the logical approaches to ethical judgments 
(Toulmin, 1950; von Wright, 1963a; 1963b; Hare, 1963; Kupperman, 2002). On this 
                                                        
9 This tactic was also used when he explained he some open criticisms to his politics as attacks from 
the supporters of Juventus (“they must be supporters of Juventus!”), the rival of the team he owns.  
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view, ethical judgments are means to lead the interlocutor to action on the basis of 
common knowledge (a commonly accepted rule of behavior) and criteria of 
classification (what is a good action, a good goal, or more simply a good car, etc.). 
These two components are strictly combined (Hare, 1963, p. 24):  
 
Let us imagine a society which places a negative value upon industry; there seem to 
be such societies in the world, in which the industrious man is regarded as a mere 
nuisance. Such a society could never (if it spoke English) express its moral standards 
by using the word 'industrious', like us, for commending people, only with a totally 
different descriptive meaning—i.e. commending them for totally different qualities, 
for example that of doing as little work as possible. If they did that, we should say 
that they had changed the meaning of the English word 'industrious'. The 
descriptive meaning of 'industrious' is much too firmly attached to the word for this 
sort of thing to be allowed; these people would be much more likely to use the word 
in its normal descriptive meaning, but neutrally or pejoratively; i.e. to give it no, or 
an adverse, prescriptive meaning. 
 
Depending on what is considered to be desirable for a given community, the 
classification of a state of affairs, an action or a behavior as “good” varies. This 
perspective is rooted in the Aristotelian ethical system, which regards every 
decisions as always aimed to a goal, which amounts to what is good (or better), or 
what appears to be good (or better) (Nicomachean Ethics 1113a 15), “for everything 
aims at the good” (the desirable, ταγαθου) (Topics 116a, 18; see Burnyeat, 1980, p. 
83). This account underscores the crucial importance of the principles of inference 
(specific loci) that we use to judge something as desirable or more desirable, or, on 
the contrary, undesirable or more undesirable (Rhetoric, 1362b 2-18). Together 
with the ideal and philosophical principles of value judgments, based on what shall 
be considered as proper for the nature of man, Aristotle provides more practical, or 
rather rhetorical, criteria, grounded on what is usually the case among people. On 
this view, values, or principles of choice, are structured in hierarchies (Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1951) depending on a man’s culture and personal dispositions:  
 
Further, a man of a given disposition makes chiefly for the corresponding things: 
lovers of victory make for victory, lovers of honour for honour, money-loving men 
for money, and so with the rest. These, then, are the sources from which we must 
derive our means of persuasion about Good and Utility. (Rhetoric 1363b 1-5) 
In the same way also it is in certain places honourable to sacrifice one's father, 
e.g. among the Triballi, whereas, absolutely, it is not honourable. Or possibly this 
may indicate a relativity not to places but to persons: for it is all the same wherever 
they may be: for everywhere it will be held honourable among the Triballi 
themselves, just because they are Triballi. Again, at certain times it is a good thing to 
take medicines, e.g. when one is ill, but it is not so absolutely (Topics 115b 19-27). 
 
Classifying a state of affairs or an entity as “good” or “bad”, or rather “desirable” or 
“undesirable” depends on considerations about the nature of the thing itself, but 
also on the purpose in relation to which a thing is regarded as good or bad. For 
instance, a man can consider a knife as good, as it cuts well, while another can 
consider it as bad, as it is dangerous or not nice (von Wright, 1963a).  
 On this perspective, values can be thought of as the reasons for classifying 
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something as desirable or not, and at the same reasons for action. By pointing out 
the qualities of a course of action, an event or an object known to fall within the 
categories of the interlocutor’s “desirable or undesirable things”, the speaker can 
provide him with a reason to act in a specific fashion. This process of reasoning is 
twofold. On the one hand, the speaker needs to classify a state of affairs as falling 
within a value. On the other hand, the desirability of a state of affairs triggers a 
pattern of reasoning leading a decision to act. The first type of reasoning can be 
described as a passage from the commitment to a specific abstract goal (honesty 
shall be praised/sought after) to the commitment to a specific one (this man shall be 
praised/supported). This transfer of commitments can be thought of as a passage 
from some qualities of the state of affairs to its classification according to a value, 
and another, proceeding from values, from the commitment to an abstract desire to 
a concrete one. The first step can be represented with the following scheme 
(Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008, p. 319):  
 
PREMISE 1:
If some particular thing a can be classified as falling 
under verbal category C, then a has property V (in virtue 
of such a classification).
PREMISE 2: a can be classified as falling under verbal category C.
CONCLUSION: a has property V.
 
Argumentation scheme 1: Argument from classification 
 
For instance, if a man ruins willingly his own country, he will be classified as “evil” 
or “contemptible”, while if someone fights for improving it, he can be classified as 
“honorable”.  
The passage from the instantiation of a value to the specific commitment 
concerning it can be represented as follows (Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008, p. 
321): 
 
PREMISE 1:
The state of affairs x is positive/negative as judged by 
agent A according to Value V (value judgment).
PREMISE 2:
The fact that x is positive/negative affects the 
interpretation and therefore the evaluation of goal G of 
agent A (If x is good, it supports commitment to goal G).
CONCLUSION:
The evaluation of x according to value V is a reason for 
retaining/retracting commitment to goal G.
 
Argumentation scheme 2: Argument from Values 
 
On this view, if “honor” is praise-worthy (contemptible), also this specific man is 
praise-worthy (contemptible).    
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The second component of ethical reasoning is the passage from moral 
judgment to action. The decision-making process can be thought of as a pattern of 
reasoning connecting a desired action, or rather a «declaration of intention» or 
commitment to bringing about a state of affairs (von Wright, 1972, p. 41) with its 
grounds (Anscombe, 1998, p. 11). A speaker can reason in two distinct fashions (von 
Wright, 1963b, p. 161; 1963a, Ch. VIII). The first reasoning is from a commitment to 
bring about a specific state of affairs to the commitment to the productive or 
necessary means to bring it about (what Abelard would call the consensus, i.e. the 
decision to engage in a specific (good or bad) activity, aimed at pursuing a specific 
(good or bad) goal, see Abaelardi Ethica, 636 A):  
 
Premise I (an agent) have a goal G.
Evaluation
Carrying out this action A is a means to realize G (Unless A is 
brought about, G will not be attained).
Conclusion Therefore A should (not) be brought about.
 
Argumentation scheme 3: Practical reasoning  
 
According to this type of reasoning, if my purpose is to support a specific honorable 
candidate, I can choose among different courses of action, such as voting for him or 
promoting his ideas among voters, and so on.  
 A different type of reasoning proceeds from an action which is the necessary 
or productive cause of a desirable or undesirable state of affairs. We can represent 
this type of reasoning as the argument from consequences (from Walton, Reed, & 
Macagno, 2008, p. 332): 
  
Premise
If action Q is brought about, good (bad) consequences will 
plausibly occur.
Evaluation
Good (bad) consequences are (not) desirable (should (not) 
occur).
Conclusion Therefore Q should (not) be brought about.
 
 Argumentation scheme 4: Argument from consequences  
 
For instance, if my choice of voting for a certain party supports the nomination of a 
contemptible person, I will not vote for such a party (necessary cause). On the 
contrary, if my support to a certain party results in an honorable person being 
elected, I will vote for it. These patterns of reasoning need also to take into 
consideration the so-called foreseeable consequences (von Wright, 1963a, Ch. 6). 
My goal of having my taxes reduced can be good; however, if the productive cause 
thereof also results in economic problems for the country or the election of a person 
unfit to govern the state in which I live, I will be pursuing an unreasonable goal (I 
choose a hierarchically inferior value over the superior one). 
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This structure of reasoning that can mirror the quasi-logical dynamic effect of 
emotive words is complex and requires a noticeable effort, in addition to 
information that a simple classification cannot provide. However, the ideal 
rationality is often quite different from reality. Aristotle pointed out that desirable 
can also be what “appears” to be good. The crucial force of emotive words lies in this 
subtle difference, which draws the distinction between systematic (or central) and 
heuristic (or peripheral) reasoning. In order to analyze this other evaluative and 
decisional process we need to investigate the second dimension of emotive words 
pointed out above, namely reason why they are “emotive”.  
 
4. EMOTIONS AND WORDS 
 
Why are some words emotive? How can an instrument that represents concepts, 
commonly used to refer to reality, bring about an emotional state? A possible 
answer can be found in the cognitivist approaches to emotions. These studies focus 
on the rational, or rather conceptual, dimension of emotions, showing how they are 
strictly interwoven (Pugmire, 1998, p. 7). For instance, an emotion of “fear” 
presupposes a value judgment on what is feared. If it is not considered as 
undesirable and probable, it cannot be feared (Leighton, 1988, p. 205; Ben Ze’ev, 
2000, p. 475). Similarly, anger involves the perception of an offence against the self. 
Emotions presuppose a specific evaluation of a state of affairs or entity, which 
makes them essentially different from feelings (De Sousa, 1987). To feel an emotion 
corresponds to implicitly appraise a state of affairs (Solomon, 2003, pp. 7-8):  
 
[…] emotions are interestingly similar to beliefs. We can now explain this similarity 
by claiming that emotions are judgments – normative and often moral judgments. “I 
am angry at John for taking (“stealing” begs the question) my car” entails that I 
believe that John has somehow wronged me […]. The moral judgment entailed by 
anger is not a judgment about my anger […]. My anger is that judgment. If I do not 
believe that I have somehow been wronged, I cannot be angry (though I might be 
upset, or sad). Similarly, if I cannot praise my lover, I cannot be in love (though I 
might want her or need her, which, traditional wisdom aside, is entirely different). If 
I do not find my situation awkward, I cannot be ashamed or embarrassed. If I do not 
judge that I have suffered a loss, I cannot be sad or jealous. […] emotions in general 
do appear to require this feature: to have an emotion is to hold a normative 
judgment about one’s situation 
 
Emotions can be defined by considering their appraisal component and their action 
tendency (Pugmire, 2005, p. 16; Keltner & Lerner, 2010, p. 324). The first 
component corresponds to the “evaluative judgments of whether an event is good or 
bad and whether people’s current actions and environment correspond to their 
personal goals and expectations” (Keltner & Lerner, 2010, p. 315). The second 
component is the organizing principle that motivates specific behaviors or 
reactions. For instance, the emotion of fear will result in a tendency to flee or reduce 
uncertainty, while anger will lead the agent to restore justice. The value judgment 
(or rather the cognitive change) is the reason for a physical and psychical reaction 
that can drive us to action (Frijda & Mesquita, 2000, p. 46).  
  The relationship between value judgments and emotions highlights another 
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important characteristic of emotional appraisal, i.e. its cultural dependence (Keltner 
& Lerner, 2010, p. 327). As emotions are grounded on value judgments, and values 
are placed in hierarchies that depend on the culture and the individual disposition, 
emotions are also influenced by culture (Smith & Lazarus, 1990, p. 627). An 
individual’s past experiences become criteria for evaluating a state of affairs as good 
or not (Damasio, 1994, p. 246). However, culture embodies the experiences of a 
community, and in this fashion provides the criteria for the evaluative judgment 
(see Frijda & Mesquita, 1998). On this perspective, an emotion is in part culture-
dependent, as it is “a system of concepts, beliefs, attitudes, and desires, virtually all 
of which are context-bound, historically developed, and culture-specific” (Solomon, 
2003, p. 87). The same action or fact can be considered as offensive in one culture 
(and trigger anger) and not-offensive in another (Frijda & Mesquita, 2000, pp. 59-
61).  
 The strict relationship between value judgments, culture and emotion is the 
ground of the rhetorical construction of emotions, in which emotive words play an 
essential role. Quintilian underscored the function that the “vivid representation” 
has in discourse (see also the notion of “vividness effect” described by Frijda, 1998, 
p. 276). The orator should amplify some details of a state of affairs to add 
“additional force to things unjust, cruel or hateful”, so that he can awaken “emotions 
which either do not naturally arise from the case or are stronger than the case 
would suggest” (Institutio Oratoria, VI, 2, 26-30). Words can be used to depict a 
scene that resembles reality, or that is similar to a situation related with the 
audience’s experiences and memories. The likeliness of the image triggers an 
immediate value judgment, resulting in an emotion (Institutio Oratoria, VI, 2, 29-31):  
 
But how are we to generate these emotions in ourselves, since emotion is not in our 
own power? I will try to explain as best I may. There are certain experiences which 
the Greeks call φαντασίαι, and the Romans visions, whereby things absent are 
presented to our imagination with such extreme vividness that they seem actually to 
be before our very eyes. It is the man who is really sensitive to such impressions 
who will have the greatest power over the emotions. Some writers describe the 
possessor of this power of vivid imagination, whereby things, words and actions are 
presented in the most realistic manner, by the Greek word ευφαντασίωτος; and it is 
a power which all may readily acquire if they will. […] I am complaining that a man 
has been murdered. Shall I not bring before my eyes all the circumstances which it is 
reasonable to imagine must have occurred in such a connexion? Shall I not see the 
assassin burst suddenly from his hiding-place, the victim tremble, cry for help, beg 
for mercy, or turn to run? Shall I not see the fatal blow delivered and the stricken 
body fall? Will not the blood, the deathly pallor, the groan of agony, the death-rattle, 
be indelibly impressed upon my mind? 
 
These words and descriptions do not simply inform us. They make us experience a 
specific emotion, something we can perceive as real, an “apparent reality” that is 
present to our senses and we cannot doubt of (Frijda & Mesquita, 2000, p. 69; Clore 
& Gasper, 2000, p. 26). The audience cannot doubt of the anger that it feels against 
the merciless assassin described by Quintilian. For this reason, his deeds, his cruelty, 
his hatefulness are apparently real. On this perspective, emotive words can be used 
to “instill beliefs”. By providing the audience with an emotional representation of a 
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person, a group or an issue, it is possible to arouse an emotion, and in this fashion 
give the interlocutor something more powerful than sheer information or truth: the 
sensation or the appearance of truth.  
Depicting individuals, groups, or issues from an emotional perspective or as 
actors in emotional events evokes emotions, and the emotions instill the belief 
constituting its appraisal dimension into the hearers (Frijda & Mesquita, 2000, p. 
47). The grammar of emotions becomes the grammar of the emotive words. When 
Grillo calls Renzi, a left wing politician, “little moron” and Bersani (the leader of the 
left wing coalition) “a loser that has shared with masons and ex fascists the bones of 
Italy”, he is not simply telling jokes. His first description is aimed at depicting Renzi 
as an inferior, triggering contempt, namely the emotion expressing “the subject's 
superiority over the object” (Ben Ze’ev, 2000, p. 390). The second funny 
characterization combines the judgment of Bersani’s inferiority with his allegedly 
unjust and evil actions, arousing anger and contempt at the same time. Berlusconi 
does the same when describes Monti as a “scumbag” or a “madman”, or when 
attacks the judges by calling them “defamation machines” or dictators. Monti’s 
image of the Pied Piper provides a strongly emotional representation of the alleged 
dangers in which the Italians are running, awakening fear.  
As seen above, emotive words are implicit arguments and instruments for 
arousing emotions. However, what makes emotive words so powerful in redirecting 
attitudes and choices? How can the rational dimension of emotions affect the 
rational assessment of a state of affairs? A possible explanation can be found in the 
analysis of the kind of reasoning that emotions trigger. 
 
5. EMOTIONS AND PERIPHERAL REASONING  
 
Emotions can be instrument for instilling beliefs. They create an apparent reality, 
something that we perceive as real even if it is not. When we fear a person that 
deceived the citizens, we strengthen or commit ourselves to that belief. When we 
feel contempt for a leader, we are led to hold his inferiority as true, even if no 
evidence is provided. When we hate the officers of a public institution, we do not 
need further proofs to judge their actions as unjust. Emotions provide us with a 
picture of reality that is more likely than the one supported by data and proofs.  
The reasoning triggered by emotions was clearly described by Quintilian. On 
his view, the orator should amplify a description to arouse a passion, because 
passions trigger a form of reasoning that is different from the systematic one. The 
judge, when overcome by passions, “abandons all attempts to enquire into the truth 
of the arguments, is swept along by the tide of passion, and yields himself 
unquestioning to the torrent” (Institutio Oratoria, VI, 2, 6). Emotions, as seen above, 
presuppose and provide the agent with an appearance of reality, an appraisal that is 
not the result of a careful assessment, but the outcome of an immediate and 
simplified perception, an interaction between the individual’s concerns and the 
object (Clore & Gasper, 2000, p. 30).  
Emotions make us jump to conclusion, trigger generalizations based on 
single experiences (Frijda & Mesquita, 2000, p. 55), resulting in attributing a single 
episodic characteristic (“he looks dangerous”) to inner, essential properties (he his 
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evil), or extending an event (“he behaved badly”) over time (“he has always been 
bad”). Such beliefs are strong, as they are felt, and “what is present to the senses 
cannot easily be doubted to exist” (Frijda & Mesquita, 2000, p. 67). For this reason, 
emotional judgments are hasty, biased and automatic conclusions of right and 
wrong (Damasio, 1994; Greene & Haidt, 2002), in the sense that they are not 
grounded on a sufficient assessment of the information available, nor can they be 
easily rebutted by more lucid and careful thoughts (Keltner & Lerner, 2010, p. 331). 
This fast appraisal triggers an immediate action tendency, a sudden decision to act 
in conformity with the emotion experienced (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). This 
combination of hasty and biased judgment and decision-making attitude 
characterizes the emotional thinking (Frijda & Mesquita, 2000, p. 64):  
 
Emotion-steered thinking shows four features that may help explain its influence 
upon beliefs. The first is instrumentality. We entertain thoughts that might help to 
achieve our emotional goals, and because they might help. Emotional thinking tries 
to solve the problems posed by the emotional predicament. The second is 
motivational force. The more urgent our goals, the greater the inclination to do what 
may help to reach them, including thought. Emotional thinking is driven by 
emotional urge. The third is control of the scope of thought. Emotional thinking is 
loath to waste time and energy by attending to irrelevant detail or indulging in 
complex inferencing. The fourth feature is motivated bias. Emotional thinking is 
biased towards beliefs that support one's emotional aims, and towards retrieving or 
generating information that does. 
 
Emotional thinking is extremely powerful because it requires little processing effort 
by the agent. He has not to carefully evaluate all the evidence concerning complex 
issues and synthetize it; a momentary feeling can trigger empirical generalizations, 
leading to strong and persistent value judgments (Keltner & Lerner, 2010, p. 331).  
 Emotional reasoning has been analyzed as different from the “central” or 
systematic type of reasoning, which requires effort, time and information (Chen & 
Chaiken, 1999). Emotions provide the individual with easily accessible information, 
namely mental contents that immediately come to mind (Kahneman, 2003, p. 699; 
706). These accessible contents, constituted by prototypes, stereotypes (namely 
generalizations accessible because of their emotional valence) or changes affecting 
one’s emotions spare the individual the effort to process information and result in 
an easy, heuristic judgment (Kahneman, 2003, p. 716). For instance, the similarity of 
an object with a prototype results in similar judgment (Kahneman, 2003); the 
similarity between two emotional experiences results in a judgment on the 
similarity of the situations or objects triggering them (Clore & Gasper, 2000, p. 26; 
Petty et al., 2004, p. 86). This fast and easy type of reasoning has been called as 
peripheral or heuristic route to persuasion (Petty et al., 2005; Chen & Chaiken, 
1999). Instead of assessing a political leader based on his achievements, records, or 
values, which would result in great effort, a person may resort to a much less 
complex judgment, grounded on a “heuristic attribute that comes more readily to 
mind” (Kahneman, 2003, p. 707). For instance, the attributes of being a “madman”, a 
“scumbag”, a “moron”, a “dictator”, a “barbarian” or a “pied piper” come easily to 
mind, as they have triggered an emotional response. Even when such attributes are 
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completely irrelevant (“scumbag”) or utterly false (“dictator”, “madman”), they 
provide us with a criterion, a peripheral route to judgment.  
 Sometimes emotive words are needed in order to summarize in a condensed 
argument and principle of heuristic reasoning more complex reasoning. Monti’s 
choice to engage in the battle of insults can be partially explained by the need of 
providing the voters with an alternative route to a judgment, a shortcut to his 
complex economic and political considerations. However, if the appearance of 
reality is good when it mirrors it, it can become highly deceitful when conceals it 
(Petty et al., 2005, p. 108):  
 
[…] sometimes the peripheral route might be the only strategy possible. For 
example, there are some issues or objects for which there are few strong arguments 
(e.g., imagine trying to sell cigarettes with a high tar content). It is not surprising 
that in these cases, ads typically contain hardly any information about the merits of 
the product (because there are none or very few) and instead contain attractive 
endorsers or majestic scenery.  
 
When arguments supporting honesty or correctness cannot be provided, when 
judgments based on past records cannot be suggested, when reasons for believing 
that a candidate is credible or is acting for the good of country cannot be found, the 
only resort is to take the other route. In this case emotive words are no longer pre-
packaged reasoning, but masks, instruments for deceiving. Moreover, the effect of 
these emotional epithets can be devastating on the other route, the rational one 
(Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). The central and systematic process can be affected 
by various variables (Petty et al., 2005). Emotive words can inhibit the central and 
more effort-requiring type of reasoning and trigger the other, fast and biased, 
process (Clore & Gasper, 2000, p. 30):  
 
Once an emotion is experienced, the system no longer operates as a scientist, 
carefully weighing the pros and cons of the belief implied by the emotion. Instead, 
the emotional person acts like a prosecutor or a defense lawyer seeking by any 
means to find evidence for the belief. Presumably, the experiential aspect of the 
emotion is itself responsible for this process of interrupting the flow, providing 
information, and, through associated beliefs, guiding attention. 
 
Weak arguments are perceived as stronger when the attention needed for the 
systematic processing lowers (Petty et al., 2004).  
On this perspective, emotive words are instruments of decision making that 
can be extremely effective. However, just like all powerful instruments, they can be 
also extremely dangerous. The fragment of reality that they bring to the 
interlocutor’s attention, the apparent reality that they provide can be a synthesis or 
a mask. Emotive words can provide a symbolic, summarized reason for a conclusion, 
but at the same time they can act as strategies for prevent a careful assessment of a 
situation.  
Clearly, when the evidence that such words are simply lies or exaggerations 
is too clear, the strategy itself risks turning against the speaker. For this reason, 
other tactics are used to prevent possible criticisms or increase the burden of an 
attack. Grillo acts in a comic environment, where exaggerations are regarded as 
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instruments for triggering humor and entertainment. Accusing him of distorting 
reality with his epithets would be like accusing him of being entertaining. Berlusconi 
plays between two roles, acting as a light-hearted and mundane entertainer and a 
serious politician according to his communicative purposes. Moreover, by turning 
political attacks into a fight of personal insults and playing the indignant and angry 
role, he manages to shift a debate into a quarrel, twisting the intentions of his 
opponents. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In the late-medieval dialectical theory, fallacies were described according to two 
criteria: their reason for the semblance, the plausible appearance that makes the 
people assent to the argument, and a reason for the failure, for their being weak or 
invalid (Kretzmann, Kenny, & Pinborg, 1982, p. 124). Emotive words provide an 
appearance of reality, a perception of a state of affairs that makes them instruments 
for easily drawing a value judgment in conditions of lack of time, resources or 
information. However, the same semblance of reality can be used to replace it with a 
distorted image, and lead the interlocutor to a judgment based on irrelevant or false 
attributes. The inner rationality of these words fades away when peripheral 
thinking takes the place of the systematic one.  
Emotive words are powerful and dangerous instruments, both for the 
audience and for the speaker. For this reason, they are often combined with side 
tactics that leave unaltered their rhetorical (persuasive) effect while affecting their 
dialectical and dialogical force. A comic actor cannot be accused of exaggerating or 
being irrelevant, an angry man cannot be blamed for being aggressive or voicing his 
personal opinions (even if publically and when acting as a public figure). 
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